One focus of our research is axiomatic and algorithmic approaches of collective decision theory. However, we also do empirical work. For example, we are currently working on a project on alternative formats for elections for which we are going to run experiments that are going to be carried out and evaluated during actual election processes.
Another specific feature of our research is the interdisciplinary approach. Several classical problems such as the aggregation of preferences and the allocation of divisible and indivisible goods (“Cake Cutting”) are put in relation to each other. In doing so we transfer the mathematical structures, properties and rules from one problem to other. This approach not only helps with the generalization of classic problems, it also facilitates the development of new problems and solutions in other application contexts (such as in the area of discrete optimization).
Our second research area concerns the foundations of the public sector. In this context we examine the public-sector institutional requirements of modern market economies. This includes the long-term dynamics of the revenue and expenditure side of public budgets, which we analyze with regard to the role of the family in tax and transfer systems.
Other work concerns the analysis of current reform options and our extensive design proposals with regard to the public-guaranteed basic income level – topics that link topical political debates with normative questions concerning the theory of institutions.